Wednesday, 23 August 2017

Would Strasbourg solve the conundrum of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland?

Last week, the High Court of Northern Ireland rejected petitions challenging the prohibition of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland. The petitions were brought by two same-sex couples who entered into civil partnerships in 2005 but want to be married couples, and by a man who lawfully married another man in England and wishes his marriage to be recognized in Northern Ireland. The petitioners claim that denying them the opportunity to marry or refusing to recognize a lawful marriage violates their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.

The context of these cases is the legislative arrangements for marriage in the UK that must, to anyone outside of the UK and most people in the UK, appear byzantine. Same-sex marriage was made lawful in England and Wales by the UK Parliament in 2013, and in Scotland by the Scottish Parliament in 2014. However, the Northern Ireland Assembly, which has competency to deal with the “transferred matter” of marriage in Northern Ireland by virtue of the devolution settlement created by the Northern Ireland Act 1998, has not legislated to make same-sex marriage lawful.

Although a majority of Northern Ireland Assembly Members voted in November 2015 in support of a Private Member’s proposal to call on the Executive to table legislation to allow for same-sex marriage (the vote was Ayes 53 and Noes 52), the proposal was negatived because a “petition of concern” had been submitted by certain Members which meant that the proposal required “cross-community” support rather than a simple majority – which it did not receive. As a consequence, the relevant marriage legislation in Northern Ireland – the Marriage (Northern Ireland) Order 2003 – continues to prohibit marriage if “both parties are of the same sex”.

The High Court of Northern Ireland - Mr Justice O’Hara’s judgments

In rejecting the same-sex marriage petitions, Mr Justice O’Hara recognized “the compelling evidence put before me about the effect on the gay and lesbian community of being treated less favourably than others so repeatedly and for so long” and noted “the psychiatric damage caused by isolation, insult and disapproval”. However, he rejected the petitions on the basis that “[i]t is not the role of a judge to decide on social policy.  That is for the Executive and the Assembly under our constitution.”

Mr Justice O’Hara reached his judgment principally by following the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. He was bound to do so by the requirement of the Human Rights Act 1998 – the legislation which gives the European Convention on Human Rights direct effect in the domestic courts of the UK – that a court determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the Strasbourg Court.

There was, on this basis, little chance that Mr Justice O’Hara was ever going to reach a different conclusion to the one set out in his judgments. He was, as he put it,  “driven to conclude that the Convention rights of the applicants have not been violated” because “the Strasbourg Court does not recognise a ‘right’ to same sex marriage. That being the case, the current statutory provisions in Northern Ireland do not violate any rights. Those rights do not exist in any legal sense.”

Would the European Court of Human Rights reach a different conclusion?

If the petitioners in these cases took their complaints to the UK Supreme Court and that court reached the same conclusion as the High Court of Northern Ireland, would “going to Strasbourg” with these complaints be worthwhile?

The simple answer is that it is almost certain that any complaint of this kind heard in Strasbourg today would fail. This is because the European Court of Human Rights has been consistently clear that “the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national law of the Contracting State” (Schalk and Kopf v Austria, 2010, para 61) on the basis that, fundamentally, “Article 12 of the Convention [the right to marry] does not impose an obligation on [a] Government to grant a same-sex couple … access to marriage” (Oliari and Others v Italy, 2015, para 192).

However, there is a “twist” in the Northern Ireland cases that may give the applicants some sense of optimism despite the Court’s settled jurisprudence. This relates to the fact that one of the applicants is not claiming the right to marry per se but, rather, the right to have a legally solemnized marriage recognized. This applicant claims that it is a violation of his Convention rights for one jurisdiction of the UK (Northern Ireland) to fail to recognize a marriage that he lawfully entered into in another jurisdiction (England and Wales).

Although the Strasbourg Court has not previously considered a case of this kind – in which the national law of a Contracting State allows same-sex marriage in one jurisdiction but not another – it is unlikely that the Court would interpret the legislative arrangements for same-sex marriage in the UK to be in violation of Convention rights. Although the Northern Ireland cases raise some new legal questions, not least in respect of a difference in treatment based on residence in different jurisdictions of a State, the Strasbourg Court would undoubtedly start from the position that there is no right to same-sex marriage under the Convention.

On this basis, the Strasbourg Court may declare the Northern Ireland complaints inadmissible under Article 12 alone and/or in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention – that has certainly been the Court’s approach in some recent cases brought before it under Article 12 about marriage discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, if the Northern Ireland complaints were declared admissible – which may be more likely because of their “special circumstances” – then the Court would probably find as follows.

Same-sex couples who wish to marry in Northern Ireland

In respect of the complaints by those same-sex couples who are in civil partnerships and wish to get married in Northern Ireland but are prevented from doing so, the Strasbourg Court would probably reiterate its settled view, as recently expressed by its Grand Chamber, that Article 12 of the Convention “secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry and to found a family” and, as such, “enshrines the traditional concept of marriage as being between a man and a woman” (Hämäläinen v Finland, 2014, para 96).

On this basis the Court would likely reiterate that Article 12 cannot be construed as imposing an obligation on the Contracting State to grant access to marriage to same-sex couples. Moreover, the Court would probably conclude that “the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage is left to regulation by the national law of the Contracting State” (in this case, the national law as determined by the Northern Ireland Assembly) and that the Court must “not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of that of the national authorities, who are best placed to assess and respond to the needs of society” (Schalk and Kopf v Austria, 2010, paras 61-62). Therefore, a complaint under Article 12 alone would likely be rejected.

What about a complaint about discrimination, brought under Article 12 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention? Clearly there is a difference in treatment between same-sex and different-sex couples in Northern Ireland, and between same-sex couples in Northern Ireland and all other couples in the rest of the UK. Such a complaint would also probably fail because the anti-discrimination provisions in Article 14 have no independent existence and have effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by the Convention. Since the right to same-sex marriage is not safeguarded by the Convention, any complaint under Article 14 would likely be rejected (see, most recently, Chapin and Charpentier v France, 2016). In addition, attempting to combine Article 14 with Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life) would also probably fail (see Schalk and Kopf v Austria, 2010).

Same-sex couples who want a lawful marriage solemnized in England to be recognized in Northern Ireland

In respect of the applicant who claims that denying his same-sex marriage legal recognition in Northern Ireland is a violation of his human rights, there are a number of arguments he could make in Strasbourg. The most obvious argument is that he is legally married but, by virtue of the legislative framework for marriage in the UK, when he travels from one legal jurisdiction to another his marriage is effectively taken away. This was a problem recognized by the United States Supreme Court when it overturned the situation in which a lawful marriage could be “stripped” from a same-sex couple when they “travel across state lines” (Obergefell v Hodges, 576 U. S. ____ (2015) page 6)

Using the argument that a State should not be permitted to “strip” a person of their lawful marriage, the applicant might find some support in the long-standing Strasbourg principle that, although Article 12 “lays down that the exercise of this right [to marry] shall be subject to the national laws of the Contracting States”, a State “must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired” (Rees v the United Kingdom, 1986, para 50).

Would the Strasbourg Court regard the national laws of the UK, which refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex English marriage as a marriage in Northern Ireland, as imposing a restriction or reduction that impairs the very essence of the right to marry? I would suggest not. The reason for this is because the “very essence” principle is relevant only in relation to the scope of Article 12 which, as the Court says, does not extend to same-sex marriage. In 2010, the Court expressed the principle in these terms: “Article 12 secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to marry … It is subject to national laws of the Contracting States but the limitations thereby introduced must not restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired” (O'Donoghue and Others v the United Kingdom, 2010, para 82). Therefore, if the right to marry relates to marriage between a man and a woman then any restriction or reduction placed on same-sex marriage by national laws would not impair that right.

Another problem for the applicant to contend with is the Strasbourg Court’s comfort with a State depriving a couple of their legal marriage based on the fact that the State does not wish to recognize a same-sex marriage. For instance, the Court declared inadmissible a complaint by a legally married couple who were required to end their different-sex marriage (and transform it into a same-sex civil partnership, if they wished) because one of the couple wanted legal recognition for their gender reassignment. Requiring them to end their marriage because the State did not recognize same-sex marriage was, the couple said, a violation of Article 12 because it impaired the very essence of their right to marry and, importantly, remain married. The Court rejected this complaint on the grounds that Article 12 does not protect same-sex marriage (Parry v the United Kingdom, 2006).

The Court would, I believe, reach a similar conclusion in respect of an English same-sex marriage being transformed into a civil partnership in Northern Ireland against the will of the couple. This is because the Court would likely say that when the national law of the State (the law of England of Wales) provided same-sex couples with the opportunity to marry it did not create a right for same-sex couples to marry under Article 12 of the Convention. As the High Court of Northern Ireland concluded, such a right does not exist in any legal sense. Therefore, requiring a legally married same-sex couple to have their marriage treated as a civil partnership in Northern Ireland does not violate that couple’s human rights.

Moreover, the fact that the UK Parliament explicitly legislated in the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 to require English same-sex marriages to be recognized as civil partnerships in Northern Ireland would probably not be taken by the Strasbourg Court as a negative. On the contrary, the Court’s current position is that same-sex couples should be provided with “a specific legal framework providing for the recognition and protection of their same-sex unions” other than marriage (Oliari and Others v Italy, 2015, para 185). The Court would likely regard the UK as having done a very “good” thing in ensuring that English same-sex marriages are recognized as civil partnerships in Northern Ireland.

For these reasons, if considered today, I think the Strasbourg Court would reject a complaint against the UK for not recognizing a lawful same-sex English marriage in Northern Ireland.

Should the Northern Ireland cases go to Strasbourg?

The fact that complaints may appear likely to fail in Strasbourg should not necessarily deter applicants from making them. When Jeffrey Dudgeon MBE went to Strasbourg to challenge the criminalization of male same-sex sexual acts in Northern Ireland in the mid 1970s (when such acts had been partially decriminalized in England and Wales) Strasbourg had been rejecting similar complaints for over two decades. In Jeffrey Dudgeon’s case, the time was right for Strasbourg to fundamentally change its mind on this issue. As a consequence, Jeffrey Dudgeon achieved a change in the law in Northern Ireland in much the same way that those who may go to Strasbourg about marriage discrimination in Northern Ireland would like to.

The jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court is always subject to evolution and its jurisprudence on same-sex marriage is no exception. Although the Court would probably reject a complaint about marriage discrimination in Northern Ireland today, it may not do so in the future. If same-sex marriage has not been introduced in Northern Ireland by virtue of a UK Supreme Court judgment, by the UK Parliament legislating directly at Northern Ireland, or by the Northern Ireland Assembly legislating itself, then, because time will have passed, the Strasbourg Court may be in a position to change its mind on same-sex marriage. Judges Spano and Bianku explicitly indicated in 2016 that “things may change” in Strasbourg on same-sex marriage (Taddeucci and McCall v Italy, 2016) and, perhaps, such a change may come in time for a Northern Ireland case to be successful.

One thing is certain: the Strasbourg Court will eventually change its mind on the issue of same-sex marriage. As this short film shows, although it often takes a very long time for Strasbourg to recognize the human rights of lesbians and gay men, it does come around on most issues in the end. That is, perhaps, the principal reason for taking complaints to the Strasbourg Court about discrimination based on sexual orientation: even if success is not likely, each complaint keeps the matter before the Court and on its radar. As Mary Simpson, the first woman in the world to make a complaint about sexual orientation discrimination under international human rights law, puts it: “You’ve got to keep chipping away at the paintwork, bit by bit, until you break through.” If a complaint gets to Strasbourg about marriage discrimination in Northern Ireland then such a case will definitely chip away at the paintwork and, perhaps, even break through.

Thursday, 17 August 2017

Strasbourg case law prevents success of same-sex marriage petition in Northern Ireland

The High Court of Northern Ireland has today delivered its judgment in In Re X, which is a case relating to same-sex marriage.

The High Court has held that the human rights of a man who entered into a same-sex marriage in England in 2014 (a part of the UK that permits same-sex marriage) have not been violated by virtue of the fact that in Northern Ireland this marriage is not recognised (and is only recognised as a civil partnership).

In reaching this decision, the High Court was significantly influenced by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on same-sex marriage. The Strasbourg Court has repeatedly held that Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrines the "traditional concept" of marriage as being between a man and a woman and cannot be construed as imposing an obligation on States to grant access to marriage to same-sex couples.

Mr Justice O’Hara, sitting in the High Court, stated: "It is not open to me to give an interpretation of the Convention which is quite different from that of the Strasbourg Court ... I must follow clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court".

The High Court's judgment shows the limitations that can be placed on domestic courts by 
the European Court of Human Rights in respect of matters relating to same-sex marriage

If the Strasbourg Court evolved its jurisprudence on same-sex marriage - particularly under Article 12 of the Convention - and recognised that the prohibition of same-sex marriage amounts to a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, then this would cascade down to the domestic courts of European states.

At present, however, the European Court of Human Rights is stifling domestic courts and preventing them from addressing and rectifying the issue of marriage inequality based on sexual orientation. 

Tuesday, 1 August 2017

The importance of "pardons" for gay and bisexual men in the UK

The semi-centennial of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 has produced widespread discussion of the social and legal history of homosexuality in the UK. 
A national conversation about the merits and flaws of the 1967 Act is to be welcomed because, as is well known, this was the first step in a legislative process of decriminalizing "homosexual acts" which concluded, at least in England and Wales, only with the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
An aspect of the current debate that I find perplexing, however, is the tendency of some people to use the anniversary of the 1967 Act to criticize recent steps taken by the UK Parliament to rectify the wrongs done to gay and bisexual men in the past. 
One of the key criticisms relates to the recent pardons issued by the UK Parliament to deceased persons who were convicted of or cautioned for certain repealed sexual offences. These pardons are also available to living people who successfully apply to have a conviction or caution for an offence "disregarded". I outlined the scope (and limitations) of the pardons here.
The argument being made against pardons is that they are an inadequate response because they offer "forgiveness" to those who committed an offence rather than an "apology" to those who were convicted. 
It is somewhat understandable that this criticism of the pardons exists because a pardon does not eliminate a conviction but, in simple terms, relieves a person from suffering any consequences arising from a conviction. Therefore, I'm not against debating the merits of pardons on this and other grounds, and I understand and share some people's ambivalence towards them.
However, what I don't share is the view that the pardons are some kind of "half way house" and that real justice would only be delivered if the government issued a formal apology. That view seems to have gained traction in recent weeks, with numerous people - including Jeremy Corbyn - calling on Prime Minister Theresa May to issue an official government apology. Mr Corbyn is reported as saying that pardons are "insufficient to say the least" and that "an apology to every gay person who was ever persecuted" should be given by the government.
I'm not opposed to the idea of asking the Prime Minister to express apology for the previous treatment of gay people, but I do find the accompanying criticisms of the pardons problematic. 
Pardoning men who were convicted or cautioned for homosexual offences can only be seen as an "empty gesture" if pardons are considered in narrow, legal terms. For instance, it could be said that there is no point to a posthumous pardon because a deceased person is no longer suffering penalties from which they need release. 
However, such an understanding misses a key point about pardons, which is that their effects are not strictly legal but, importantly, also highly symbolic. For example, the pardons granted in 2006 to servicemen executed for disciplinary offences during the Great War were designed to recognize these men as "victims" of that war. Therefore, although in strict legal terms these pardons may appear somewhat "weak", in symbolic terms they are a powerful mechanism whereby social value is attributed to those once considered to be, amongst other things, cowards. 
The posthumous pardons issued to gay and bisexual men, which extend back to 1533, have a similar symbolic effect. They "rehabilitate" - to use a somewhat problematic term - those who were, for centuries, regarded as social outsiders. They give back to those who were executed, imprisoned or otherwise punished, the value that society robbed of them.
Lord Lexden, speaking in the House of Lords during a recent debate on the pardons, said that they "make reparation, to the extent that it is possible and practicable, to those still living and remove a terrible stain from the reputations of those who are no longer alive, for the comfort of their families". I agree. 
The powerful, symbolic effects of pardons stem from the fact that they are, in this case, granted by the UK Parliament through statute law. Enshrining the pardons in legislation means that the supreme authority of our country - Parliament - has recognized, in law, that the treatment of gay and bisexual men in the past was cruel and wrong. The law has therefore come full circle. This is, to my mind, a far more potent way of expressing an "apology" than words spoken by a Prime Minister.
The pardons show how far the UK Parliament has come on the issue of homosexuality. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the word "homosexuality" being spoken for the first time in a Parliamentary debate. Lord Dawson of Penn first used the word in the House of Lords in 1937 in an attempt to make "the practice of homo-sexuality" an explicit ground for divorce. Since then, the Parliamentary approach to legislating on issues relating to homosexuality has completely transformed. Whereas Parliament was once dominated by homophobic ideas, it is now an institution in which respect for equality on the grounds of sexual orientation is the accepted norm. 
There is, of course, work left for the UK Parliament to do - not least in respect of expanding the "disregard scheme" to allow gay and bisexual people living with convictions or cautions to obtain a disregard and a pardon for offences not currently covered by the scheme - but we should not criticize our legislators for the work they have done so far. Rather, we should look to our Parliament and feel absolute pride for what has been done - often by way of imperfect means, like pardons - to right the wrongs of the past. 
We should also remember that enshrining the pardons for gay and bisexual men in statute law has been no easy task and has required tenacious campaigning. A key figure in this campaign has been Lord Sharkey, who twice introduced the Alan Turing (Statutory Pardon) Bill in the House of Lords, in 2012 and 2013, as "a symbolic first step" towards addressing the hardship suffered by generations of gay people and, importantly, as a means of persuading the government to act. Alan Turing was eventually pardoned directly by Her Majesty the Queen, but it was Lord Sharkey who moved amendments to the Policing and Crime Bill in 2016 that introduced the pardons for other gay and bisexual men in England and Wales. 
Of course, as Lord Cashman said in a recent debate in the House of Lords on the pardons, "I remind myself that what we achieve now is not achieved by us but was made possible by a thousand generations of LGBT people and our heterosexual allies who stood up and fought for equality, often giving up their livelihoods, their freedom and, in some instances, their lives". That's true. But let's not belittle the work that legislators in both Houses of Parliament, across all political parties, have done to achieve these recent, important reforms. Let's ask them to continue this work and, importantly, to encourage legislators in other countries around the world - including those in Council of Europe states - to adopt the same approach. 

Sunday, 16 July 2017

Protection from "hate speech" - Beizaras and Levickas v Lithuania

The Fourth Section of the European Court of Human Rights has communicated the case of Beizaras and Levickas v Lithuania. The case concerns the alleged failure of domestic authorities to adequately investigate incitement to hatred and violence against LGBT people in general and against the applicants in particular.

The applicants, Pijus Beizaras and Mingirdas Levickas, are a same-sex couple. At the start of their relationship, Mr Beizaras posted a picture on his Facebook profile of him kissing Mr Levickas. The picture was accessible to the general public. The picture was widely viewed and attracted many comments which, Mr Beizaras and Mr Levickas claim, were aimed at inciting hatred and violence against LGBT people in general and threatening them personally. 

Examples of the comments are: 
“Faggots should be burned (Sudeginti piderastus)”  
“You both should be thrown into the gas chambers (I duju kameras abu)” 
"You are fucking gays – you should be exterminated (Gėjai jūs supisti, jus naikinti nx.)”  
“... faggots... such should be hit into the head (... pydarasai... Pisti y galva tokiems reikia)” 
“You faggots should not post such photographs; such faggots should be given a good kicking (Pydarai jūs nekelkit fotkes tokias, suspardyt tokius pidarastus)”  
“Kill them! (Žudyt!)”
The domestic authorities would not undertake a criminal investigation of the comments, despite the Lithuanian Criminal Code prohibiting “Incitement against Any National, Racial, Ethnic, Religious or Other Group of People”. This decision was upheld by the domestic courts, who regarded Mr Beizaras and Mr Levickas to have engaged in “eccentric behaviour”.

The Court has issued the following questions to the parties:

  1. Has there been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8 thereof, on account of the domestic authorities’ decision to discontinue the criminal investigation concerning the comments on the first applicant’s Facebook social network page (see Vejdeland v. Sweden, no. 1813/07, § 55, 9 February 2012; also see, mutatis mutandisIdentoba and Others v. Georgia, no. 73235/12, §§ 70 and 71, 12 May 2015, and R.B. v. Hungary, no. 64602/12, §§ 39 and 40, 12 April 2016)?
  2. Have the applicants suffered discrimination on the grounds of their sexual orientation, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Articles 8 and 13? The Court refers to the applicants’ grievance about the Lithuanian authorities’ predisposed bias against a homosexual minority (see, mutatis mutandisSmith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 121, ECHR 1999‑VI; also see Identoba and Others, cited above, § 68), given that the two applicants’ same-sex kiss picture had been interpreted by those authorities as “eccentric behaviour” and as “attempt to deliberately tease or shock individuals with different views or to encourage the posting of negative comments” which, in turn, also led those authorities to discontinue the criminal investigation.

Thursday, 13 July 2017

Homophobia in the European Court of Human Rights

The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dedov (the judge for the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights) in the case of Bayev and Others v Russia has certainly raised some eyebrows. 

In dissenting from the majority judgment in Bayev, which strongly condemns legal provisions in Russia that prohibit the “propaganda of non‑traditional sexual relations aimed at minors”, Judge Dedov's remarks have been called, amongst other things, "outrageously homophobic" and "indefensible to the Western mentality".

I certainly agree with those who condemn Judge Dedov's stated views on homosexuality - which include offensive (but predictable) remarks linking homosexuality and paedophilia - but I also welcome Judge Dedov making his views explicit. 

Given that the European Court of Human Rights (and former European Commission of Human Rights) has always been, and continues to be, comprised of some individuals who are hostile to the development of LGBT human rights, I think it is important that those individuals make their views clear.

We usually only see, as in this case, homophobia explicitly expressed when a sexual orientation complaint is upheld by a majority and a judge feels motivated to voice his (it is usually "his", not "her") hostility. But such explicit expressions of homophobia should be welcomed, because knowing that such homophobia exists in the Court helps us to understand why sexual orientation discrimination complaints are often rejected. 

If there was no homophobia in Strasbourg, wouldn't the complaints by same-sex couples about the blanket exclusion from marriage in some contracting states have succeeded? Of course, Strasbourg judgments contain many politely formulated legal reasons when complaints about marriage discrimination based on sexual orientation are rejected, but only the most naive person would rule out that such reasons are "contaminated" (to use one of the Court's terms) by homophobia. 

Judge Dedov's expression of homophobic ideas in the Court is not unique. In fact, Judge Dedov is merely the latest in a long list of Strasbourg judges and former commissioners who have publicly expressed their antipathy to homosexuality. I think we should thank Judge Dedov for "coming out" on this issue, because he has provided those of us who aim to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation, by way of the European Convention on Human Rights, with a useful reminder: not all those in Strasbourg share our aspirations. 

Judge Dedov's homophobic dissenting opinion provides an opportunity to remember some other similar outbursts in Strasbourg. Here's my "top five": 
“While considering the respect due to the private life of a homosexual … we must not forget and must bear in mind that respect is also due to the people holding the opposite view, especially in a country populated by a great majority of such people who are completely against unnatural immoral practices.” Judge Zekia, 1981.  
“A distinction must be drawn between homosexuals who are such because of some kind of innate instinct or pathological constitution judged to be incurable and those whose tendency comes from a lack of normal sexual development or from habit or from experience or from other similar causes but whose tendency is not incurable. So far as the incurable category is concerned, the activities must be regarded as abnormalities or even as handicaps…” Judge Walsh, 1981  
“…adolescent homosexual relationships have a more negative impact on emotional and psychological development than heterosexual relationships. In these circumstances I think that there is an objective and sufficient justification … to set a different age for each type …” Mr Martinez (European Commission of Human Rights), 1997. 
“…if homosexuals had a right to be members of the armed forces their sexual orientation could become known either through them disclosing it or manifesting it in some way … I find that the … discharge [of homosexuals from the armed forces] as being necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and the prevention of disorder.” Judge Loucaides, 1999. 
"Homosexuals, like anybody else, have a right to be themselves and should not be the target of discrimination or any other adverse treatment because of their sexual orientation. However, they must, like any other persons with some peculiarity, accept that they may not qualify for certain activities which, by their nature and under certain circumstances, are incompatible with their lifestyle or peculiarity.” Judge Loucaides, 2008.

Tuesday, 20 June 2017

Russian "homosexual propaganda" laws are a violation of the ECHR

Many thanks to Silvia Falcetta, for the following very insightful analysis:

Bayev and Others v Russia

The Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights issued today its judgment in Bayev and Others v Russia in which it held  by six to one  that Russian ‘homosexual propaganda laws’ are in breach of Article 10, alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

This judgment is crucial in many ways. It is the first time that the Court has found a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 10 in relation to sexual orientation discrimination, and this is the first judgment that deals with Russian ‘homosexual propaganda laws’ enacted after Alekseyev v Russia

The Court has rejected all the arguments of the Russian government and, in doing so, has adopted a strongly worded reasoning that leaves no space for ambivalent interpretations.

The Facts

The applicants were three Russian gay activists alleging that the legislative ban on ‘propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations aimed at minors’ violated their right to freedom of expression and was discriminatory (§ 3).

On 30 March 2009 the first applicant was charged for holding a static demonstration in front of a secondary school in Ryazan, holding two banners which stated ‘Homosexuality is normal’ and ‘I am proud of my homosexuality’. On 11 January 2012 the second and the third applicants held a static demonstration in front of a children’s library holding banners stating ‘Russia has the world’s highest rate of teenage suicide. This number includes a large proportion of homosexuals. They take this step because of the lack of information about their nature. Deputies are child-killers. Homosexuality is good!’ and ‘Children have the right to know. Great people are also sometimes gay; gay people also become great. Homosexuality is natural and normal’. Finally, on 12 April 2012 the third applicant held a demonstration in front of the St Petersburg City Administration to protest against the newly amended legislation that introduced administrative liability for public activities aimed at the promotion of paedophilia and of homosexuality, bisexuality and/or transgenderism among minors. In that occasion the third applicant held up a banner with a popular quote from a famous Soviet-era actress: ‘Homosexuality is not a perversion. Field hockey and ice ballet are.’ (§ 8- 18)

They were each found guilty of the administrative offence of ‘public activities aimed at the promotion of homosexuality among minors’ (§ 7); the Constitutional Court of Russian Federation declared inadmissible the complaints brought by the applicants and, in 2014, it considered the introduction of administrative liability for the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations among minors as, inter alia, necessary ‘to prevent their attention being increasingly focused on issues concerning sexual relations, which are capable, in unfavourable circumstances, of deforming significantly the child’s understanding of such constitutional values as the family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood, and adversely affecting not only his or her psychological state and development, but also his or her social adaptation.’ (§ 25)

The applicants complained about the existence of the ban on public statements concerning the identity, rights and social status of sexual minorities, under Article 10, and they complained about the discriminatory nature of that ban, under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 10.

The Court’s reasoning

The Court framed the case as related to ‘the very existence’ of a legislative ban on promotion of homosexuality or non-traditional sexual relations among minors (§ 61) and it focused on ‘the necessity of the impugned laws as general measures’ (§ 64). In particular, the Court extensively discussed whether such ban could be considered necessary and legitimate in a democratic society for the protection of health and morals and the rights of others:

Justification on the grounds of protection of morals

The Court denied that the social acceptance of homosexuality is incompatible with maintaining family values as the foundation of society. First, it reiterated that under the Convention it is ‘incumbent’ on the State to take into account developments in society and to acknowledge that there is not just one way or one choice when it comes to leading one’s family or private life (§ 67).  Secondly, the Court denied that gay men and lesbians might in any way endanger ‘family values’ and it remarked that ‘the steady flow of applications’ (ibid) to the Court from gay men and lesbians who wish to have access to the institutions of marriage, adoption and parenthood demonstrate that homosexuals share family values and do not threaten them. Thirdly, and relatedly, the Court took note that the majority of Russians allegedly disapprove of homosexuality and resent any display of same-sex relations (§ 70), but it reiterated that ‘it would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Convention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority’ (ibid) and, crucially, it held:

the legislation at hand is an example of such predisposed bias, unambiguously highlighted by its domestic interpretation and enforcement, and embodied in formulas such as “to create a distorted image of the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional sexual relationships” (…) and references to the potential dangers of “creating a distorted impression of the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional marital relations” (…). Even more unacceptable are the attempts to draw parallels between homosexuality and paedophilia. (§ 69)

Justification on the grounds of protection of health

The Russian government had also argued that the promotion of same-sex relationships and homosexual behaviour had to be banned on the grounds that, compared to the traditional family, ‘same-sex relations were associated with greater health risks, in particular that of contracting HIV, and that they impeded population growth’ (§ 49). The Court considered ‘improbable’ that a restriction on freedom of expression concerning LGBT issues would be conducive to a reduction of health risks (§ 72) and, most importantly, it highlighted that ‘disseminating knowledge on sex and gender identity issues and raising awareness of any associated risks and of methods of protecting oneself against those risks, presented objectively and scientifically, would be an indispensable part of a disease-prevention campaign and of a general public-health policy’ (§ 72). The Court also noted that population-growth depends upon a ‘multitude of factors’, related to socio-economic condition and not to the promotion of ‘non-traditional’ sexual models (§ 73). Therefore, the Court concluded that the government had not adduced any relevant justification on the grounds of protection of health.

Justification on the grounds of protection of the rights of others

The government’s third line of argument contended that minors had to be shielded from information which could convey a positive image of homosexuality, as a precaution against their conversion to a ‘homosexual lifestyle’ which would be detrimental to their development, make them vulnerable to abuse and result in contraposition with the educational choices of the vast majority of Russian parents.  First, the Court commented that the vagueness of the terminology adopted allowed framing as ‘homosexual propaganda’ any public actions that did not depict homosexuality in negative terms. As the Court noted, indeed, ‘the absence of a negative connotation may in itself be perceived as conveying a positive attitude’ (§ 75) and the ‘incidental or potential sighting by a minor’ sufficed to outlaw ‘promotion’ in any venue (ibid). Secondly, the Court noted that the Government had failed to explain why they considered that minors were more vulnerable to abuse in the context of homosexual relationships than in heterosexual ones and it reiterated that in absence of evidence such an assumption amounted to a manifestation of predisposed bias (§ 79). Thirdly, and relatedly, the Court considered that ‘nothing on their banners could be interpreted as a proposal to provide tuition on gender issues’ (§ 80) and it also emphasized that ‘in sensitive matters such as public discussion of sex education, where parental views, educational policies and the right of third parties to freedom of expression must be balanced, the authorities have no choice but to resort to the criteria of objectivity, pluralism, scientific accuracy and, ultimately, the usefulness of a particular type of information to the young audience’ (§82). The Court recognised that an educational environment opened to diversity, equality and tolerance could only be conducive to social cohesion and it would give practical expression to the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation Rec(2010)5 which encourages ‘safeguarding the right of children and youth to education in safe environment, free from violence, bullying, social exclusion or other forms of discriminatory and degrading treatment related to sexual orientation or gender identity [as well as] providing objective information with respect to sexual orientation and gender identity, for instance in school curricula and educational materials’ (ibid).


In the light of the above considerations, the Court concluded that ‘by adopting such laws the authorities reinforce stigma and prejudice and encourage homophobia, which is incompatible with the notions of equality, pluralism and tolerance inherent in a democratic society.’ (§ 83)

Moreover, since the ban applied only to non-traditional sexual relationships, the Court considered it as stating ‘the inferiority of same-sex relationships compared with opposite-sex relationships’ (§ 90) and, hence, as embodying ‘a predisposed bias on the part of the heterosexual majority against the homosexual minority’ (§ 91). 

On this basis, the Court found a violation of Article 10, alone and in conjunction with Article 14.

It could be argued that this judgment was quite foreseeable, since different bodies of the Council of Europe had already expressed criticism and concern about the laws affecting gay men and lesbians in the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, today the Court has eminently reiterated that sexual orientation discrimination is incompatible with the Convention. It is to be hoped that this judgment will discourage other countries from adopting similar discriminatory laws and that it will force the Russian Federation to better ensure the rights and freedoms of gay men and lesbians throughout its jurisdiction.